What Davutoglu conceals is the fact that the “Arab Spring” is not a spontaneous uprising of the masses, but a planned project in order to transform the region, which is performed actively by Turkey in a cooperation with the U.S. President Obama who has fired the starting pistol for this in August 2010 with his “Presidential Study Directive 11“, shortly after the collapse of the two-state solution in the Middle East conflict that he had intended, and also shortly after “Cablegate” became more obvious, but long before the self-immolation of the Tunisian Mohamed Bouazizi.
Since the upheaval in Eastern Europe, which was driven by masses in 1989 on a closer inspection was also planned by a significant proportion of the governments of the U.S. and allied NATO countries and then conducted, and so the analogy to the Eastern European transition is even somehow correct, the detail of the upheaval that it is decisively driven and operated by foreign countries, which do not belong to the states that experience these upheavals, first appears somehow negligible.
Another aspect of the lack of the historical detail of the massive foreign interference may be the insistence that the upheavals in Eastern Europe were driven by peaceful masses, although Yugoslavia, for example, at least, has been extremely “violent” transformed by US-led armed groups like the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) and bombers of NATO, but even here, the analogy to the actions of the NATO countries for the “transformation” of Libya 2011 roughly corresponds with the historical model of Eastern Europe.
The details of the foreign influence in the upheavals, however, are important when it comes to the point to recognize to which extent the situation in 2011 in the Arab world is similar to has happened in 1989 in Eastern Europe, and to what extent the intentions and capabilities of the relevant foreign governments in the upheaval in the Arab world in 2011 are different from 1989 for the change in Eastern Europe.
If there is a significantly different situation and also different intentions and capabilities of the stakeholders, it is natural to expect that these differences imply different processes and can also lead to different results.
The first parts of the analysis of the Turkish foreign policy by this German blog has shown on the basis of a speech that was given by the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu to the investment bank Goldman Sachs on 22.11.2011, that the major driving force of the Turkish foreign policy was not the desire for peace, but rather that the “zero-problem” foreign policy was seen merely as an appropriate means of obtaining the “hinterland” that is needed for the rise of Turkey to a world power.
The Turkish assessment has changed with the “regime changes” in the Arab World that were initiated by Barack Obama in August 2010.
Henceforth it seems for the Turkish governance, in order to obtain Turkish hinterland for the rise of Turkey as a world power that the best means are to aggressively take the lead of the purportedly democratic, and from the feelings of Israeli humiliation, US-led regime changes. This part of the analysis shows how the Turkish government has miscalculated in their foreign policy in terms of Syria.
Contrary to the general acceptance of relevant Turkish politicians like Davutoglu, the situation in 2011 in the Arab world differs significantly from the situation in Eastern Europe in 1989. Davutoglu has stated that the upheaval in Eastern Europe in 1989 was due to the end of the East-West conflict, and now, the changes due to the end of the East-West conflict, would be caught up on the Arab world. It is true that the East-West conflict has been the most influential conflict in Europe of the second half of the 20th Century.
The European states were strung along the two blocks, the NATO and the Eastern Bloc. Therewith, that the Soviet Union was no longer willing and no more able in 1989, to keep the Eastern European countries in its block system, the path was open for the more or less peaceful “revolution”, which were organised by the NATO countries, in the Eastern European countries, which ideological followed the line of freedom and democracy of the winner, and the incorporation of these so “transformed” Eastern European countries into the NATO bloc.
However, in the Arab world, the East-West conflict was and is just a conflict among several conflicts. Another major conflict in the Arab world is the Middle East conflict, therefore the neo-colonial Palestine conflict along the regional power centres of Iran and Israel.
In addition, there is also a Sunni-Shiite secular conflict-dimension in the Middle East, and at least, potentially there is also a dormant monarchist-republican line of conflict. These ideological and interstate conflicts in the Arab world are in contrast to the East-West conflict anything but decided, and they affect there the social ideology, government action and the creation of alliances significantly.
Another difference is the situation that the year 2011 is no more the year of 1989 and that the circumstances have changed since then.
The East-West conflict came to an end in 1989 with the victory of the NATO block and the collapse of the Soviet Union, but in 2011, in the place of the East-West conflict there are now largely cooperative competition, in which some of the former conflicting states along the lines NATO/EU/G7 and CSTO / SCO / BRICS are now confronted with various security and economic issues, whereby the CSTO / SCO / BRICS countries in the year 2011 are economically much stronger than the states of the Warsaw Pact have ever been – and certainly stronger than the Soviet Union in the years around 1989, when it was highly weakened by economic failures and the war in Afghanistan.
In Europe in 1989, there were only two groups of governmental and ideological actors, the West Block and the East Block. By the weakness of the Eastern Bloc, the way was open for the governmental and ideological actors, which belong to the victorious West bloc, to “transform” the East bloc, because there were no significant countervailing forces anymore. From the various conflicts in the Arab world, it follows, that there are several groups of strong governmental and ideological actors with different objectives active.
If the Turkish government in cooperation with the U.S. government tries to transform the Arab states into free-democratic states and to integrate them into the Western system, following the role model Turkey, so to “transform” the hinterland of Turkey, then a massive resistance is inevitable.
Davutoglu has pointed out in his presentation at Goldman Sachs, that the Arab street (Arab way) and the Arab youth would feel humiliated by Israel, and at the same time, he has declared that the transformation, which is supported by him, should lead in the Arab countries to democratic governments, whose governmental policies is in line with the wishes of the masses.
It goes without saying that the regional power Israel has no interest in such an outcome, namely, to be surrounded by Arab states, whose governments do not accept the humiliation by Israel, will be the result of such a transformation in the Arab world and it will try everything that is possible to ensure that this will not happen. Furthermore, the unpopular rulers of the monarchies have a huge interest in the fact that freedom and democracy will not break out in their states.
In particular, the ruler clan of Saudi Arabia, strengthened by its petrodollar, has a massive problem with a freedom and democracy like the Turkish model, because he knows exactly, that a theoretically conceivable transformation of Saudi Arabia into a constitutional monarchy on the role model of Britain or Norway is hardly possible due to his unpopularity.
Likewise, some powers fear within and outside the region, the emergence of popular Shiite governments to the role model and in cooperation with Iran, for example, in Bahrain or in Yemen by the Zaydi (Zaidiyyah), and a growing influence of pro-Iranian Shiite minorities in other Arab states, for example, in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, if freedom and democracy will break out everywhere in the region. Thus, also entrenched economic interests are associated with this, because Shiites are living on the most productive oil and gas fields.
If Shiites in the Arab world, wherever they regionally form the majority of the population, would take the power above the oil and gas fields, on which they are living, just as it happened in Iraq in the aftermath of the US-led war in 2003, then pro-Iranian Shiites could be able to control the most important energy resources in the world. That would not only be a nightmare for Zionists and the Wahhabi Saudi leaders, but also for the entire axis NATO/EU/G7.
Furthermore, some of the Arab states, which are designated by Davutoglu for an Islamic democracy on the model of Turkey, had for many decades a secular system, which originated from the idea of socialism, and it is very questionable whether the majority of the population in mainly Sunni states such as Algeria, Libya and Syria really ever want to have a religiously liberal Western-style democracy on the model of Turkey.
An internal resistance of at least noteworthy parts of the population, even if they do not receive much support from outside, can be able to clearly complicate the Turkish-American project to democratize the Arab world, as it was the case in Yugoslavia.
One major difference of the states of the Arab world to the countries of Eastern Europe in 1989 is also that some countries in the Arab world are economically important, and also much intertwined with the economy of non-Arab states. In 1989, Eastern Europe had a rather low importance for the countries outside Eastern Europe, most likely for the Soviet Union; but also for the Soviet Union, the economic relations to Eastern Europe were not crucial.
Indeed, there were also some other economic links, such as between the GDR and the FRG, but they were out of sight of the Western perspective in terms of the overall economy relatively insignificant. The economic relations of the Eastern European countries to countries outside Europe, for example, to China, Cuba and North Korea, were insignificant in terms of the global economics in 1989. Potential production- and sales market and investment losses by the upheaval in Eastern Europe in 1989 only had a little influence on the rest of the world in 1989.
With respect to the countries of the Arab world, the situation is very different. The economy of some Arab states is global of utmost importance. Should be a significant part of the oil production in the Arab world fail because of the processes of transition, this will have serious consequences on almost the entire world. Already the mere fear of failures in the oil production can lead to severe increases in the oil prices, throwing the Western states into recessions.
Moreover, some wealthy Arab states are for others, also for non-Arab states, important markets and investors. If the rulers of the GCC countries, for example, remove the invested petrodollar assets in the NATO countries, this could cause an economic crash in those states. By the action of an Arab investment deduction, Turkey could be taken in particular.
If the GCC states decide, in response to a US-led coup attempt in the Arab world, to no more sell the oil for the U.S. dollar, but rather for the Chinese Yuan and Gold, the U.S. dollar could lose its role as the world reserve currency and the U.S. economy would suffer a sustainable shipwreck. In short: the Eastern European countries in 1989 had little global economic significance, the states of the Arab world, however, are of a very large global economic importance.
Understanding the Disastrous Foreign Policy of Turkey – Part 1
Understanding the Disastrous Foreign Policy of Turkey – Part 2
Understanding the Disastrous Foreign Policy of Turkey – Part 3
Understanding the Disastrous Foreign Policy of Turkey – Part 4
Understanding the Disastrous Foreign Policy of Turkey – Part 5
Understanding the Disastrous Foreign Policy of Turkey – Part 7